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T

he centennial year of the birth of Dwight David Eisenhower (born 14 October
1890) provides an opportune occasion to review and assess his leadership
and generalship. Ike came to command late in life. Although he graduated
from West Point in 1915, until 1942 he had held only one command, and that a
stateside training post for less than a year in 1918. Until December 1942, when
he paid a visit to the front lines in Tunisia as Commander of the Allied Force
Headquarters, he had never heard a shot fired in anger.
Yet on 8 November 1942, Eisenhower commanded the first Allied offensive of the war—Operation Torch. It was an extraordinarily complex operation.
His forces, British and American, land, sea, and air, were attacking at three
widely separated points—Casablanca, Algiers, and Oran—against a neutral
force, the French colonial army, without a declaration of war. The Casablanca
striking force, led by George S. Patton, Jr., combat-loaded in Virginia and sailed
across the Atlantic to make its landing. The American and British forces that
loaded in Great Britain for the attacks on Algiers and Oran had to sail through
the Straits of Gibraltar. What the French would do, no one knew. Eisenhower
hoped to persuade them, through diplomacy rather than force of arms, to join
the Allied cause rather than resist.
In short, Eisenhower, in his first experience in either combat or command,
faced problems that were serious in the extreme and as much political as military. His staff was at least as tense as he was and looked to him for leadership.
But leadership was a subject he had studied for decades. It was not an art in
his view, but a skill to be learned. “The one quality that can be developed by
studious reflection and practice is the leadership of men,” he had written to his
son John at West Point.1 Here was his chance to show that he had developed it.
In the event, Eisenhower not only exercised leadership, but learned new
lessons. It was “during those anxious hours” in Gibraltar, he later wrote in a
draft introduction to his memoirs that he finally decided to discard, “that I first
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realized how inexorably and inescapably strain and tension wear away at the
leader’s endurance, his judgment, and his confidence. The pressure becomes
more acute because of the duty of a staff constantly to present to the commander the worst side of an eventuality.” In this situation, Eisenhower realized,
the commander had to “preserve optimism in himself and in his command.
Without confidence, enthusiasm, and optimism in the command, victory is
scarcely obtainable.”
Eisenhower also realized that “optimism and pessimism are infectious
and they spread more rapidly from the head downward than in any other direction.” He saw two additional advantages to a cheerful and hopeful attitude by
the commander: First, the “habit tends to minimize potentialities within the
individual himself to become demoralized.” Second, it
has a most extraordinary effect upon all with whom he comes in
contact. With this clear realization, I firmly determined that my
mannerisms and speech in public would always reflect the cheerful
certainty of victory—that any pessimism and discouragement I might
ever feel would be reserved for my pillow. I adopted a policy of circulating through the whole force to the full limit imposed by physical
considerations. I did my best to meet everyone from general to private
with a smile, a pat on the back, and a definite interest in his problem.2

Eisenhower initially seemed to be a better diplomat than soldier.
The deal he struck with Admiral Jean Darlan, Commander-in-Chief of the
French armed forces in Africa, quickly brought French resistance to an end.
Although the agreement was subject to harsh criticism, especially from liberals in the United States and the United Kingdom because of Darlan’s fascist
politics, it freed Ike’s forces to strike east against the Germans in Tunisia. But
Eisenhower’s decisiveness and willingness to take risks on the political front
contrasted sharply with his indecisiveness and caution on the military front.
He failed to galvanize his troops; the Germans solidified their hold on Tunisia;
a stalemated campaign resulted. In February, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel
counterattacked at Kasserine Pass; the American forces there were ill-served
by their seniors and suffered a humiliating defeat. Eisenhower later recognized
that the fault was his because he had not been ruthless enough in dismissing
incompetent commanders, especially II Corps Commander Lloyd Fredendall.
Ike learned from his mistakes, however. Kasserine, he told Chief of
Staff George C. Marshall, was a blessing in disguise, because American troops
had profited from the experience. The men, he reported, “are now mad and
ready to fight. All our people, from the very highest to the very lowest, have
learned that this is not a child’s game and are ready and eager to get down
to business.”3 He brought Patton over from Casablanca to take command in
Tunisia, and told Patton (in advice that might better have been self-directed),
“You must not retain for one instant any man in a responsible position where
you have become doubtful of his ability to do the job. This matter frequently
calls for more courage than any other thing you will have to do, but I expect
you to be perfectly cold-blooded about it.”4 To an old friend, Leonard Gerow,
then training an infantry division in Scotland, Ike expanded on the theme.
“Officers that fail,” he wrote, “must be ruthlessly weeded out. Considerations
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of friendship, family, kindliness, and nice personality have nothing whatsoever
to do with the problem. You must be tough.” He told Gerow to get rid of the
“lazy, the slothful, the indifferent, or the complacent,” even if he had to spend
the rest of his life writing letters explaining his actions.5
In short, North Africa hardened Eisenhower. But he still had much
to learn. After the victory in North Korea, he launched the invasion of Sicily
(July 1943). The decision to go into Sicily showed the strategic caution of the
Allies, and of Eisenhower—Sicily was defended by Italian troops of dubious
quality and only two German divisions. It was a long way from Rome, much
less the heart of Germany. He allowed Bernard L. Montgomery, commanding
the British forces, and Patton to conduct risk-free campaigns that moved at a
slow pace and failed to bag many German prisoners. In September, he launched
his third amphibious attack, on the Italian mainland at Salerno, once again a
cautious strategic decision as Salerno was well south of Rome. He called off at
the last minute an airborne operation designed to capture Rome, judging the
risk to be too high. The result was another stalemate; not until nine months later
would Allied troops finally get to Rome.
The year 1943 had been marked by great gains on the map. The forces
under Eisenhower’s command had conquered Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia,
Sicily, and southern Italy. The strategic gains, however, had been small at
best. Germany had not lost any territory critical to her defense. She had not
been forced to reduce her forces in France or in Russia. Taken as a whole,
Eisenhower’s campaigns from November 1942 to December 1943 must be
judged a strategic failure.
By no means was that altogether his fault. In the summer of 1942 he
had warned his political bosses about what was going to happen if they turned
down Operation Roundup, a proposed invasion of France, in favor of Torch, the
invasion of North Africa. Still, some of the blame did fall to Eisenhower. The
excessive caution with which he opened the campaign, his refusal to run risks
to get to Tunis before the Germans, his refusal to take a chance and rush troops
into Sardinia, his refusal to relieve Fredendall, his refusal to take a grip on the
battle in Sicily, his refusal to seize the opportunity to take Rome with the 82d
Airborne—all contributed to the unhappy situation he left behind in Italy. The
Allied armies were well south of Rome as winter set in, with little hope of any
rapid advance. They had spent great resources for small gain.
On the political side, the legacy of the campaign was one of profound
mistrust of the Americans and the British by the French and the Russians, each
of whom wanted a second front in northwest France, and each of whom was
deeply suspicious of the Darlan deal. In sum, the campaign brought minimal
military rewards at the cost of diplomatic disaster.
Yet there was at least one clear gain from 1943 for the Allies—the year
had given the high command in general, and Eisenhower particularly, along
with his troops, badly needed experience. Further, Eisenhower had learned
which of his subordinates could stand up to the strain of battle, and which
could not. Had it not been for Torch, had Roundup been launched in 1943
instead of Overlord in 1944, the Allies would have gone ashore with an insecure
Eisenhower in command of inexperienced troops led by Lloyd Fredendall. The
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idea of Fredendall in charge at Omaha Beach is by itself enough to justify the
Mediterranean campaign.
In his first combat experience, Eisenhower had been unsure of himself,
hesitant, often depressed, irritable, liable to make snap judgments on insufficient information, defensive in both his mood and his tactics. But he had
learned how critical it was for him to be always cheery and optimistic in the
presence of his subordinates, how costly caution can be in combat, and whom
he could rely upon in critical moments.
In the Mediterranean campaign. Eisenhower and his team had
improved dramatically. As they prepared for the climax of the war, the invasion
of France, they were vastly superior to the team that had invaded North Africa
in November 1942. In that respect, the payoff for Torch was worth the price.
Eisenhower’s role in the invasion of France is so well known that it
needs only the briefest reference here. Indeed, it is so well known that it can be
said that his place in history was fixed as night fell on the Normandy beaches on
6 June 1944. Hundreds of thousands, indeed millions, of men and women contributed to the success of Operation Overlord, and 200,000 soldiers, sailors, and
airmen participated directly on D-Day itself, but the operation will forever be
linked to one name, Dwight Eisenhower. From inception to completion, it bore
his personal stamp. He was the central figure in the preparation, the planning,
the training, the deception, the organization, and the execution of the greatest
invasion in history. At the decisive moment he was the commanding general
who ordered the American airborne to carry out the planned mission, despite
last-minute predictions from his Air Commander, Trafford Leigh-Mallory, that
the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions would suffer 70 percent casualties and
be incapable of carrying out their assigned tasks. Eisenhower was the general
who, standing alone, weighed all the factors in light of the adverse weather,
considered all the alternatives, listened to the view of his senior subordinates
(split right down the middle), and made the decision he was born to make.
In the campaign that followed D-Day, Eisenhower’s biggest problem
sometimes seemed to be more British Field Marshal Montgomery, less the
Germans. Monty’s hesitancy before Caen, through June and most of July 1944,
infuriated Ike’s staff and the American generals in the field. Monty’s failure
to close the gap at the Falaise pocket in August all but drove Patton to turn
on the British and, as he said, “drive them into the sea for another Dunkirk.”
Patton and his immediate superior, General Omar Bradley, blamed Ike as much
as Monty, because in their view Ike should have either fired Montgomery or
forced him to attack.
Their anger grew that fall, when Monty failed to take the port of Antwerp
and failed to marshal his forces to get to Arnhem. Montgomery then made
the situation worse by demanding that he be made single ground commander
(meaning that he be put in charge of the American operations as Bradley’s
superior) and that the British 21st Army Group be given all incoming supplies
for a single thrust to Berlin. Patton meanwhile demanded that Ike stop Monty
where he was, give US Third Army all the supplies, and let Third Army launch
a single thrust south of the Ardennes to Berlin.
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Eisenhower insisted on advancing both south and north of the Ardennes,
with the British and Americans more or less abreast—the so-called broad-front
strategy. Bradley, Montgomery, and Patton were all furious. Each general
charged that Ike was a compromiser, a commander who was afraid to make
the tough decision. Each charged that Ike always seemed to agree with the last
man he talked to, to accept his plan, only to reverse himself when he talked to
the next guy.
It was a most serious charge, and a bit off the mark. Montgomery tended
to hear what he wanted to hear, read what he wanted to read; Eisenhower tended
to seek out words and phrases that would appease. There was, consequently, a
consistent misunderstanding between the two men. Nevertheless, Eisenhower
never yielded on the two main points, command and single thrust—not in
August and September 1944, nor again when they were raised in January
and March 1945. He took and kept control of the land battle just as he said
he would. And he never wavered, from the moment he first saw the Supreme
Headquarters Alllied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) plans for a two-front
advance into Germany to the last month of the war, on the question of the
so-called broad front.
Ike did waver, sometimes badly, on some important issues—primarily
the relative importance of Arnhem and Antwerp, and the meaning of the word
priority. But he never told Montgomery anything that a reasonable man could
have construed as a promise that Patton would be stopped in Paris and 21st
Army Group be sent on to Berlin. Nor did he ever encourage Patton to believe
that he would be sent to Berlin alone. He always insisted on invading Germany
from both north and south of the Ardennes.
His reasons were manifold. His analysis of German morale and geography played a large role. Even after the Allies got through the West Wall, a
significant barrier would remain between them and the German heartland, the
Rhine River. A single thrust, especially beyond the Rhine, would be subject
to counterattacks on the flanks. Eisenhower believed that the counterattacks
might be powerful enough to sever the supply lines and then destroy the leading
armies. With the Allies’ limited port capacity, they could not bring forward
adequate supplies to sustain an army beyond the Rhine. Every mile that the
advancing troops moved away from the Normandy ports added to the problems. For example, forward airfields had to be constructed to provide fighter
support for the troops. But to construct them it was necessary to move engineers
and building materials forward, at the expense of weapons and gasoline. One
senior engineer involved pointed out that if Patton had gone across the Rhine
in September he would have done so without any logistical or air support at all.
“A good task force of Panzerfaust, manned by Hitler Youth, could have finished
them off before they reached Kassel.”6 As for Monty’s 21st Army Group, his
own chief of staff Freddie de Guingand pointed out that when (and if) it reached
the Rhine, bridging material would have to be brought forward at the expense
of other supplies. Like Eisenhower, de Guingand doubted that there would be
a collapse of German morale; he expected the enemy to fight to the bitter end.
As, of course, the Germans did; it took the combined efforts of 160
Russian divisions and the entire AEF and an Italian offensive and eight
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additional months of devastating air attack to force a German capitulation.
After the war, de Guingand remarked, a bit dryly, that he had to doubt that
Montgomery could have brought about the same result with 21st Army Group
alone. “My conclusion, is, therefore,” de Guingand wrote, “that Eisenhower
was right.”7
The personality and political factors in Eisenhower’s decision are
obvious. Patton pulling one way, Montgomery the other—each man insistent, each certain of his own military genius, each accustomed to having
his own way. Behind them were adulating publics, who had made Patton
and Montgomery into symbols of their respective nation’s military prowess.
In Eisenhower’s view, to give one or the other the glory would have serious
repercussions, not just in the howls of agony from the press and public of the
nation left behind, but in the very fabric of the Alliance itself. Eisenhower
feared it could not survive the resulting uproar. It was too big a chance to take,
especially on such a risky operation. Eisenhower never considered taking it.
Montgomery and Patton showed no appreciation of the pressures
on Eisenhower when they argued so persistently for their plans, but then
Eisenhower’s worries were not their responsibility. Montgomery wanted a
quick end to the war, he wanted the British to bring it about, and he wanted
to lead the charge into Berlin personally. Patton would have given anything to
beat him to it. Had Eisenhower been in their positions, he almost surely would
have felt as they did,and he wanted his subordinates to be aggressive and to
believe in themselves and their troops.
Eisenhower’s great weakness in this situation was not that he wavered
on the broad-front question, but that he was too eager to be well liked and
too interested in keeping everyone happy. Because of these characteristics, he
would not end a meeting until at least verbal agreement had been found. Thus
he did appear to be always shifting, “inclining first one way, then the other,”
according to the views and wishes of the last man with whom he had talked.
Eisenhower, as British Field Marshal Alan Brooke put it, seemed to be “an
arbiter balancing the requirements of competing allies and subordinates rather
than a master of the field making a decisive choice.”8 Everyone who talked
to him left the meeting feeling that Eisenhower had agreed with him, only to
find out later that he had not. Thus Montgomery, Bradley, and Patton filled
their diaries and letters and conversations with denunciations of Eisenhower
(Bradley less so than the others).
The real price that had to be paid for Eisenhower’s desire to be well
liked was not, however, animosity toward him from Montgomery and Patton.
It came, rather, on the battlefield. In his attempt to appease Montgomery and
Patton, Eisenhower gave them great tactical leeway, to the point of allowing
them to choose their own objectives. The result was one of the great mistakes
of the war, the failure to take and open Antwerp promptly, which represented
the only real chance the Allies had to end the war in 1944. The man both
immediately and ultimately responsible for that failure was Eisenhower.
Through November and on into December of 1944, Ike’s armies kept
pounding at the Germans, all across the front that now stretched from the Swiss
border to the North Sea. On 16 December the Germans launched a completely
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unexpected and astonishingly strong counteroffensive in the Ardennes. The
Germans managed to achieve an eight-to-one advantage in infantrymen and a
four-to-one advantage in tanks. The ensuing Battle of the Bulge was by far the
largest ever fought by the US Army, and the costliest, with more than 40,000
casualties in one month.
Eisenhower accepted the blame for the surprise, and he was right to do
so, as he had failed to read correctly the mind of the enemy. He failed to see that
Hitler would take desperate chances, and Eisenhower was the man responsible
for the weakness of the American line in the Ardennes because he was the one
who had insisted on maintaining a general offensive.
But despite his mistakes, Ike was the first to grasp the full import of the
offensive (Bradley had dismissed it as a spoiling attack; Eisenhower insisted
that it was a genuine counteroffensive). Ike was the first to be able to readjust
his thinking and the first to realize that—although the surprise and the initial
Allied losses were painful—in fact Hitler had given the Allies a great opportunity by bringing his armies out from the shelter of the West Wall. On the
morning of 17 December, only hours after the German attack began, Ike wrote
the War Department, “If things go well we should not only stop the thrust but
should be able to profit from it.”9 It was Ike who decided that Bastogne was the
critical point, and who insisted on holding the Belgian town. It was Ike who,
very much against Patton’s initial wishes, ordered the Third Army to break off
its offensive to the east and attack to the north, to relieve the encircled 101st
Airborne in Bastogne. It was Ike who decided to put in motion a counterattack
designed to destroy the German panzer armies in the Ardennes, not just hold
them. In all these decisions, the event proved him right.
In January and February 1945, Ike insisted on attacking all along the
line. He wanted to destroy as much of the German army as he could west of
the Rhine River. Monty again—and Patton, too—urged that the other guy be
stopped where he was, to allow a single thrust. Eisenhower refused. He rightly
believed that killing Germans west of the Rhine was a whole lot easier than
killing them east of the Rhine was going to be, and so long as Hitler was willing
to fight west of the Rhine, Ike was going to take advantage of his opportunity.
In March, the Allies got a great break when they captured intact the
Ludendorf Bridge at Remagen. The plan had called for crossing the Rhine
north and south of Remagen, but Ike instantly decided to make a major crossing
in the center, with US First Army. He was able to do so because his armies
had closed to the Rhine all along its length, which gave him great flexibility. It
proved to be the correct decision—American troops poured over the bridge and
quickly encircled the German armies to the north. Within weeks, Allied forces
were overruning Germany.
On 7 May 1945 at SHAEF headquarters in Reims, France, the Germans
signed the unconditional surrender. After the signing, which took place at 2:30
a.m., Eisenhower opened a bottle of champagne to celebrate. It was flat. So
was Ike, who was dead tired. Instead of celebrating, he went to bed.
Eisenhower’s lack of fizz in those wee hours notwithstanding, it is
proper that we raise our glasses now to what he had accomplished and what
he had cause to celebrate. The problem is that one searches in vain for fitting
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accolades to acknowledge the accomplishments of Dwight D. Eisenhower in
the Second World War. How does one satisfactorily remark on what he endured,
on what he contributed to the final victory, on his place in military history?
Fortunately George C. Marshall, next to Eisenhower himself the man
most responsible for Ike’s success, spoke for the nation and its allies, as well
as the US Army, when he replied to Eisenhower’s last wartime message.
“You have completed your mission with the greatest victory in the history of
warfare,” Marshall began. “You have commanded with outstanding success the
most powerful military force that had ever been assembled. You have met and
successfully disposed of every conceivable difficulty incident to varied national
interests and international political problems of unprecedented complications.”
Eisenhower, Marshall said, had triumphed over inconceivable logistical problems and military obstacles. “Through all of this, since the day of your arrival
in England three years ago, you have been selfless in your actions, always sound
and tolerant in your judgments, and altogether admirable in the courage and
wisdom of your military decision.
“You have made history, great history for the good of mankind, and
you have stood for all we hope for and admire in an officer of the United States
Army. These are my tributes and my personal thanks.”10 It was the highest
possible praise from the best possible source. It had been earned.
Eisenhower had earned the praise through a total commitment of his
time, energy, and emotion, of course, but even more through his brains, talents,
and leadership. He had also been lucky—in his assignments, in his aides and
subordinates and superiors, in his opponents, in the weather on D-Day. He
had received so many good breaks, in fact, that “Eisenhower’s luck” became a
byword. But much more than luck was involved in his success.
One leadership attribute was his attention to detail, complemented by
his intuitive knowledge of which detail to pay attention to. His decision on the
weather on D-Day, for example, was not just pure dumb luck. For a month
before the sixth of June, he had made time in his overcrowded schedule to spend
15 minutes every day with his weatherman, Group Captain Stagg. He would
hear Stagg’s prediction for the next couple of days, then query him on the basis
of the judgment. He wanted to know how good Stagg was, so he would be able
to make his own evaluation when the time came.
As a soldier, Eisenhower’s chief characteristic was his flexibility.
He often said that in preparing for battle, plans were essential, but that once
the battle was joined, plans were useless. Nowhere did this characteristic
show more clearly or effectively than in his response to the capture of the
bridge at Remagen.
Eisenhower was outstanding at the art of mentally leaping over the front
lines to get into the mind of the enemy. He alone understood, in September
1944, that the Germans would fight furiously until they had no bullets left, just
as he understood on 17 December that the Germans were launching a counteroffensive in the Ardennes, not just a counterattack.
In the Mediterranean, he had been excessively cautious in his generalship, but in the campaign in northwest Europe, he showed boldness and a
willingness to take risks. The best example was his decision to go ahead with
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the D-Day drops of the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions in the face of Air
Commander Trafford Leigh-Mallory’s strongly worded recommendation that
they be called off. In view of the indispensable contributions of the paratroopers to the success of D-Day, for that decision alone Eisenhower earned his fame.
Ike made mistakes in Europe, although fewer than he had in the
Mediterranean. Some came about because of greater goals, for example, maintaining a united front with America’s British allies. Appeasing Montgomery
meant the failure to take Caen in mid-June 1944; it meant failure to totally
destroy the German army at Falaise in mid-August; it meant failure to take
Antwerp in mid-September. It also cost the Allies dearly in early January 1945,
when Monty failed to bag the Germans in the Bulge. That led to the heaviest
losses of the war for the American Army.
To Eisenhower’s critics, his biggest mistake was his failure to take
Berlin (this author would hotly dispute that judgment). On an even larger scale,
he was certainly wrong in 1945 to have such faith (or hope) in the future of
US-Soviet relations. He should have recognized that the issues that divided the
reluctant allies were too great to be overcome.
But as a strategist, the highest art of a commander, he was far more
often right than wrong. He was right in his selection of Normandy as the invasion sight, right in his selection of Bradley rather than Patton as First Army
Commander, right in his insistence on using bombers against the French railway
system, right to insist on a broad-front approach to Germany, right to see the
Bulge as an opportunity rather than a disaster, and right to fight the major battle
west of the Rhine. Eisenhower was right on the big decisions.
He was the most successful general of the greatest war ever fought.
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